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Government Regulation of the Place and
Manner of Protected Speech in a Public
Forum
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that
expression is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tions.' Unlike the strict scrutiny which the Court applies to gov-
ernmental regulations aimed at the content of one's communica-
tion,' a more permissive level of scrutiny is applicable when a
regulation is merely content-neutral.3 Specifically, to survive con-
stitutional scrutiny as a permissible time, place, or manner regula-
tion, a restriction must be "content-neutral,... narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest, and [must] leave open
ample alternative channels of communication."'4  Applying this
1. See, e.g., Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (summarizing the Supreme Court's early experiences with time,
place, and manner regulations). Time, place, or manner regulations entail governmental re-
striction upon the physical impact of all communication, irrespective of content. Farber &
Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1237 (1984).
2. To survive first amendment scrutiny, a content-based governmental regulation of
expression must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). Content based restrictions limit communica-
tion on the basis of the message conveyed. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 46, 47 (1987). Furthermore, they create opportunities for selective application of the
law. Farber & Nowak, supra note 1, at 1231. Moreover, content based regulations are anti-
thetical to first amendment values as they violate the core principle that "government may
not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views." Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96
(1972)).
3. The Supreme Court would classify as "content neutral" those regulations that "are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech." Renton, 475 U.S. at 48
(quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added)). The requirement of content neutrality serves to exclude
regulations that are content based from this type of analysis because content based regula-
tions must meet a more stringent standard. See supra note 2.
4. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. The same test applies to all content neutral
regulations regardless of the nature of the forum. Farber & Nowak, supra note 1, at 1239
(claiming that the Supreme Court's opinion in Members of the City Council of Los Angeles
1
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standard last term in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,6 the Supreme
Court held that New York City's guideline for sound amplification
in Central Park's Naumberg Bandshell was a permissible regula-
tion of the time, place, or manner of expression because the guide-
line: (1) was content neutral; (2) was narrowly tailored to serve the
substantial governmental interests of avoiding excessive sound vol-
ume and providing sufficient amplification within a public concert
ground; and (3) left open ample alternative channels of communi-
cation.' Most importantly, the Court expressly stated that the con-
tent neutral regulation at issue need not be the least intrusive
means of achieving a substantial governmental interest in order to
be deemed narrowly tailored.7 Rather, a regulation is narrowly tai-
lored by a showing that the regulation promotes "a substantial
governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively ab-
sent the regulation."'
The controversy in Ward v. Rock Against Racism arose when
Rock Against Racism, an unincorporated association "dedicated to
the espousal and promotion of anti-racist views," challenged New
York City's Use Guidelines 0 for the Naumberg Bandshell in Cen-
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), supports this assertion). "The first part of the
[time, place, or manner test] excludes cases involving content discrimination [detection of
content-based restrictions]; these cases require scrutiny under more demanding tests. The
other two parts of the test are designed to ensure that the governmental regulation does not
unduly restrict the channels of communication." Farber & Nowak, supra note 1, at 1239.
5. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
6. Id. at 2760.
7. Id. at 2757-58. Cf. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1988)
("the method and extent of [time, place, and manner] regulation must be reasonable, that
is, it must be the least intrusive upon the freedom of expression as is reasonably necessary
to achieve a legitimate purpose of the regulation.").
8. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). The Court further clarified its position by indicating that a party need
only show that the regulation is "not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government's interest .... " Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2758.
9. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
10. The Use Guidelines, promulgated by New York City in 1986, provide, in pertinent
part:
SOUND AMPLIFICATION
To provide the best sound for all events Department of Parks and Recrea-
tion has leased a sound amplification system designed for the specific demands
of the Central Park Bandshell. To insure appropriate sound quality balanced
with respect for nearby residential neighbors and the mayorally decreed quiet
zone of Sheep Meadow, all sponsors may use only the Department of Parks and
Recreation sound system. DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION IS
TO BE THE SOLE AND ONLY PROVIDER OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION,
INCLUDING THOUGH NOT LIMITED TO AMPLIFIERS, SPEAKERS,
MONITORS, MICROPHONES, AND PROCESSORS.
Clarity of sound results from a combination of amplification equipment and
[Vol. 7:103
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tral Park." Rock Against Racism brought suit seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, on the ground that the Use Guidelines were facially invalid as
a prior restraint on the association's first amendment right of free
expression. 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York found the Use Guidelines' requirements for sound am-
plification, processing fees, and vehicle permits valid, but struck
down requirements for user fees and insurance, as well as time and
crowd size limitations.' s Rock Against Racism appealed the district
court's ruling only to the extent that the court failed to enjoin en-
forcement of the city's sound amplification guideline." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, refusing
to uphold the validity of the city's sound amplification guideline.
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
O'Brien,5 the court of appeals stated that the method and extent
of government restrictions on protected speech "must be the least
a sound technician's familiarity and proficiency with that system. Department of
Parks and Recreation will employ a professional sound technician [who] will be
fully versed in sound bounce patterns, daily air currents, and sound skipping
within the Park. The sound technician must also consider the Bandshell's prox-
imity to Sheep Meadow, activities at Bethesda Terrace, and the New York City
Department of Environmental Protection recommendations.
Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 368, n.1 (2d Cir. 1988).
The Use Guidelines also included permit requirements, including a non-refundable
processing fee, a clean-up bond, a user fee of $100.00 per performance hour plus a one hour
sound check, and vehicle permits for which no fee was charged; insurance in the amount
required by the city's Parks Department; different time limitations for various Bandshell
events; limitations on the number of spectators; and prohibitions on solicitations at Band-
shell events. Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1350-59. Although the term "guidelines"
was used, the city acknowledged that the guidelines were intended as enforceable regula-
tions. Id. at 1350.
11. The Naumberg Bandshell is a popular open air entertainment facility used for
various performances during a season which runs from mid-spring through early fall. Id. at
1351. In 1979, Rock Against Racism began sponsoring annual programs at the Naumberg
Bandshell which included musical groups and speakers representing anti-racist views. Rock
Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2750.
12. Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
13. Id. at 1351-59.
14. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 368 (2d Cir. 1988). After the guide-
lines were promulgated, Rock Against Racism obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining
the city from applying certain of the guidelines, including the sound amplification guideline,
to Rock Against Racism. Some fifty to sixty other performances, operating in accordance
with the guidelines, were held during the 1986 season. Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at
1352. The District Court found that Bandshell sponsors during the 1986 season were "uni-
formly pleased" with the city's sound amplification system and the city's technician who
controlled the sound quality and volume. Id.
15. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
1989]
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intrusive upon the freedom of expression as is reasonably neces-
sary to achieve a legitimate purpose of the regulation.' 6 Although
the court of appeals acknowledged the city's significant interest in
controlling sound volume,'7 the court nevertheless held the sound
amplification guideline invalid because it required the use of the
city's sound system and technician, a method that the court found
not to be the least intrusive means of achieving the governmental
interest in volume regulation. 8
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy"9 found that the court of appeals "erred
in requiring the city to prove its regulation was the least intrusive
means of furthering its legitimate governmental interests. '20 Addi-
tionally, the Court rejected Rock Against Racism's argument that
the guideline was facially invalid because it "places unbridled dis-
cretion in the hands of city officials charged with enforcing it."'2 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court addressed the issues of whether
the Use Guidelines were content neutral and narrowly tailored to
serve a substantial government interest, and whether their promul-
gation left open ample alternative channels of communication.2 2
After looking to the city's underlying justification for promul-
gating the guideline, the Court determined the sound amplification
guideline was content neutral.23 Restrictions on communication
were content neutral, Kennedy claimed, if they could be "justified
without reference to the content of regulated speech."'2' The Court
found the city's desire to control noise for the purposes of retain-
ing the sedate nature of other areas of the park and to avoid intru-
sion into surrounding residential areas was not motivated by the
16. Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at 370.
17. Id. at 371. There is no question that the government has "a substantial interest in
protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise." Members of the City Council of Los Angeles
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984) (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949)). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) ("If overamplified loud-
speakers assault the citizenry, government may turn them down.").
18. Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at 372.
19. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'ConnDr, Scalia, and White joined Justice
Kennedy's opinion. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2750 (1989). Justice
Blackmun concurred in the judgment. Id.
20. Id. at 2753.
21. Id. at 2755.
22. Id. at 2753-60.
23. Id. at 2754-56.
24. Id. at 2754 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984)) (emphasis added by the Court).
[Vol. 7:103
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content of the communication which the guidelines sought to regu-
late.25 Moreover, the Court concluded that the city's other justifi-
cation-ensuring the sound quality of the performance-was simi-
larly content neutral because the city's technician, as a rule,
deferred to the sound mix requests of the performers.2 6
Next, the Court held that the Use Guidelines were a narrowly
tailored means to promote a substantial government interest, thus
satisfying the second prong of the time, place, or manner analy-
sis." In arriving at this determination, the Court first concluded
that New York City had a "substantial interest in ensuring the
ability of its citizens to enjoy whatever benefits the city parks have
to offer, from amplified music to silent meditation. s28 Finding the
city's justifications for the Use Guidelines to be substantial inter-
ests, the Court next had to determine whether the City's promul-
gation of the Use Guidelines was a narrowly tailored means to pro-
mote these interests. In answering this query, the Supreme Court
most emphatically took exception to the Second Circuit's treat-
ment of the case. Specifically, the Court found that the court of
appeals had erred when it concluded that because the city failed to
show "that the requirement of the use of the city's sound system
25. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2754-55.
26. Id. Although the district court found that it was the city's practice to give the
performers or sponsors autonomy with regard to sound quality by having the city's sound
technicians do all they could to accommodate the sponsor's desires as to sound mix, Rock
Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), there was nothing in the
guideline itself that stated that the sound technician must defer to the wishes of the per-
formers or sponsors.
The Court refused to decide whether to extend to the facts of this case the body of law
that permits a party to facially challenge a regulation. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at
2755. The Court will find a regulation facially invalid where the regulation vests government
officials with impermissibly broad authority to regulate speech. Note, The Supreme
Court-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 251 (1988). A statute invalid in all possible
applications, as opposed to being invalid only in a specific application, is facially invalid. Id.
at 251 n.1. The Supreme Court has struck down statutes as facially invalid in a number of
factual scenarios. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138
(1988) (holding an ordinance which vests unbridled discretion in a mayor to license newspa-
per vending machines facially invalid); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (holding a
statute requiring approval of motion pictures prior to display facially invalid). Although
Rock Against Racism contended that the city could decide to provide inadequate sound
based on the content of the music, the Court felt this fell short of a charge of unbridled
discretion to deny the right to present musical programs altogether. Rock against Racism,
109 S. Ct. at 2755. Essentially, the Court determined that the guideline could not be inter-
preted "to [permit) selecttion of] inadequate sound systems or to vary sound quality or
volume based on the message being delivered by performers." Id. at 2756.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2757. Specifically, the Court found the city to have a substantial interest in
protecting its citizenry from unwelcome noise as well as in guaranteeing the adequacy of a
sound amplification at Bandshell events. Id. at 2756-57.
19891
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and technician was the least intrusive means of regulating the vol-
ume," the Use Guidelines were not "narrowly tailored."2 9 Claiming
that the least restrictive means analysis was never a component of
the time, place, or manner inquiry, the Supreme Court expressly
rejected the Second Circuit's reading of "narrowly tailored" to re-
quire the "least intrusive means." Instead, the Court stated that
"the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the...
regulation promoted a substantial government interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 0
Applying this more deferential standard, the Supreme Court
unequivocally found the Use Guidelines to be a narrowly tailored
means to promote the city's substantial interests. The Court felt
that both the city's interest in limiting sound volume, as well as its
interest in guaranteeing the quality of sound at bandshell events,
were promoted by the Use Guidelines' requirement that the city's
sound technician operate the mixing board during bandshell
events; without this requirement, the Court posited, the city's in-
terests "would have been served less well .... ,
The Use Guidelines easily satisfied the third prong of the
time, place, or manner standard-that the restriction leave open
ample alternative channels of communication.3 2 The Court claimed
that the Use Guidelines were much less constraining than regula-
tions it previously had upheld because the Guidelines do not pro-
hibit any particular manner or type of communication at a particu-
lar place or time.33 In fact, the Court reasoned, "the guideline
continues to permit expressive activity in the Bandshell, and has
no effect on the quantity or content of that expression beyond reg-
ulating the extent of amplification."34 Although conceding that the
city's regulation of the extent of sound amplification may have the
effect of reducing the potential audience, the Court was not con-
cerned with this consequence because, it reasoned, Rock Against
Racism had not shown that the alternative channels of communi-
cation were inadequate."'
29. 848 F.2d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
30. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
31. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2759. The Court stressed that its finding may
have been different had there not been evidence that the guidelines did not have a deleteri-
ous effect on the ability of the performers to achieve the sound they desired. Id.
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III. THE DISSENT
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that by permitting the city
to adopt a regulation that was not the least intrusive means neces-
sary to achieve its interest, the majority had abandoned the re-
quirement that government time, place, or manner regulations be
narrowly tailored." Further, Justice Marshall accused the majority
of countenancing government control of speech prior to its dissem-
ination, an unconstitutional prior restraint."
In asserting that the majority had retreated from the narrow
tailoring requirement for time, place, or manner regulations, the
dissent took issue with the majority's use of Regan v. Time3" and
United States v. Albertini39 for the proposition that the Court
need not perform a least restrictive alternative analysis.40 Specifi-
cally, Justice Marshall pointed out that Justice White's opinion in
Regan commanded the votes of only three other Justices, and Al-
bertini involved a military base, not a traditional public forum.41
In contrast to the majority's holding that to be narrowly tai-
lored, a time, place, or manner regulation need only "promote[] a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effec-
tively absent the regulation,""2 the dissent argued that the nar-
rowly tailored requirement necessitates an examination of alterna-
tive means of achieving the substantial government interests and
"a determination whether the greater efficacy of the challenged
regulation outweighs the increased burden it places on protected
speech."4 s
The dissent contended that by refusing to engage in an analy-
36. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Stevens joined Justice Mar-
shall's dissent.
37. Id.
38. 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
39. 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
40. Addressing in Regan the constitutionality of a federal law which criminalized the
publishing of photographs of United States currency except under certain prescribed cir-
cumstances, Justice White wrote, "the less-restrictive-alternative analysis . . . has never
been a part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place and manner regulation." Regan,
468 U.S. at 657. In Albertini, the Court found a law which prohibited individuals barred
from military bases from reentering to be a valid time, place, or manner restriction even
though there was some imaginable alternative that may have been less burdensome on
speech. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689.
41. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2761 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2758 (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 698).
43. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2761. Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162
(1939) (invalidating a ban on handbill distribution on public streets where less restrictive
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sis of the availability of alternative means equally capable of
achieving the government interest but imposing less of a burden on
speech, the majority cut the "narrowly tailored" requirement off at
its knees."' Justice Marshall stated that if the Court had per-
formed a least-restrictive-means analysis, the city's guidelines
would not have withstood constitutional scrutiny since the city's
interest in avoiding noise cannot justify the city's commandeering
total control over the sound equipment. "5
Additionally, the dissent found the Use Guidelines inconsis-
tent with the first amendment's fundamental aversion to prior re-
straints."6 In fact, Justice Marshall characterized the city's seizure
of exclusive control over a musician's sound equipment as a "quin-
tessential" prior restraint.4 Justice Marshall argued that "through
its monopoly on sound equipment," the city is able to distort and
silence communication in advance of its expression." In essence,
he found the Use Guidelines to be no less of a prior restraint be-
cause the censorship was effectuated by the "single turn of a
knob," as opposed to the traditional "stroke of a pen."
Having characterized the Use Guidelines as a prior restraint,
Justice Marshall charged that the Court should have examined the
Use Guidelines as though they were presumptively invalid.5 0 If pre-
sumptively invalid, Marshall asserted, the Guidelines only would
have survived constitutional scrutiny if they were "accompanied by
the procedural safeguards necessary 'to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system.' ,,51 Specifically, Marshall argued that the city,
44. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2762-63.
45. Id. at 2762. Justice Marshall expressed a belief that the majority's treatment of
the narrowly tailored requirement would have far reaching implications. In fact, he stated
that the majority's approach functionally has eliminated the "narrowly tailored" require-
ment as a component of the time, place, or manner analysis. Id. at 2762. Moreover, he ar-
gued that, "logically extended," the Court's decision would render the continued inviolabil-
ity of many of our people's most traditional and cherished forms of communication
susceptible to the whim of governmental caprice. For example, he claimed that "after to-
day's decision a city could claim that bans on handbill distribution or on door to door solici-
tation are the most effective means of avoiding littering or fraud, or that a ban on loud-
speakers and radios in a public park is the most effective means of avoiding loud noise." Id.
at 2762.




50. Id. (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975)
("Any system of prior restraint, however, comes to [the Supreme Court] bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.")).
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in conjunction with the Use Guidelines, should have established
"neutral criteria embodied in 'narrowly drawn, reasonable and def-
inite standards,' in order to ensure that discretion is not exercised
based on the content of speech.""2 Additionally, Marshall claimed
that, as a system of prior restraint, the regulations warranted an
immediate judicial determination that the communication under-
taken in the Bandshell was not protected by the first
amendment.53
Justice Marshall concluded that the Guidelines were utterly
void of the requisite procedural safeguards.6 4 First, he claimed
that, by not defining "best sound" and "appropriate sound qual-
ity," as those phrases are used in the Guidelines, the city failed to
include the requisite neutral criteria that would be embodied in
"narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards. '5  Without
these neutral criteria, Marshall averred, there is no mechanism to
ensure that the city does not use its broad discretion to control the
music on the basis of content.5 "
Secondly, Marshall pointed to the absence of any mechanism
for prompt judicial review of the potential constraints on musical
expression.5 7 He claimed that because the city technician controls
expression by making decisions about the sound mix and volume
throughout each performance, 8 neither Rock Against Racism, nor
any other program sponsor, could attempt to have any of the tech-
nician's discrete decisions judicially reviewed.59 As Marshall poign-
antly notes: "There is, of course, no time for appeal in the middle
of a song." 60 That being the case, the Use Guidelines impermissibly
restrained communication because "no court ever determined that
52. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2763 (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 271 (1951)).
53. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2763 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
54. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2763.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2764.
57. Id. at 2763.
58. Justice Marshall described the immense amount of discretion the city's sound
technician possesses:
The city's sound technician consults with the performers for several minutes
before the performance and then decides how to present each song or piece of
music. During the performance itself, the technician makes hundreds of deci-




60. Id. at 2764-65.
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a particular restraint on speech is necessary." 61 Justice Marshall
concluded that with no mechanism for prompt judicial review, and
in light of the absence of detailed, neutral standards to curb the
city's discretion in restricting expression, the Use Guidelines are an
unconstitutional prior restraint."2
IV. ANALYSIS
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism the Supreme Court ad-
dressed a number of issues that go to the heart of first amendment
jurisprudence. While the Court reaffirmed the essential role of the
content neutral/content based distinction in first amendment
cases, it more significantly clarified the narrow tailoring require-
ment essential to judicial scrutiny of time, place, or manner re-
strictions. Additionally, the Court prescribed a deferential role for
the judiciary when evaluating the constitutionality of these govern-
mental efforts to control the time, place, or manner of otherwise
protected speech.
The Court correctly determined the sound amplification
guidelines to be content neutral. In doing so, it distinguished con-
tent based regulations from those at issue in Rock Against Ra-
cism.'s As the Court correctly noted, "[the government's purpose
is the controlling consideration" for a court assessing the content
neutrality of a regulation limiting speech."' Primarily a court must
ask "whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys." 6 Clearly,
the Use Guidelines applied across the board to all who chose to
perform at the Naumberg Bandshell-irrespective of a group's
message. In fact, both the majority and the dissent agreed that the
City's justifications of noise control and sound quality were not di-
rected at the content of a particular performance. Therefore, by
definition, the regulations were content neutral.6 6
61. Id. at 2765.
62. Id.
63. The Court cited Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), and noted that an inquiry as
to whether less restrictive alternatives are available is appropriate where content based, but
not content neutral, regulations are at issue. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2758 n.6.
64. Id. at 2754.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 3 (discussing content neutrality). In what the dissent found to be a
dangerous inroad, Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2761 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting), the
majority claimed that a regulation serving "purposes unrelated to the content of expression
is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others." Id. at 2754 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)). Conse-
quently, even if Rock Against Racism had been impacted more by the regulations than
[Vol. 7:103
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The Court's analysis of the narrow tailoring requirement is
more nettlesome. In deciding Rock Against Racism, the Second
Circuit used the standard articulated in United States v.
O'Brien:6 7 incidental restrictions on first amendment freedom
should be no greater than essential to further a substantial govern-
ment interest.8 8 The court of appeals interpreted O'Brien's lan-
guage to require an analysis of alternatives to the sound amplifica-
tion guideline; consequently, the court of appeals construed the
"narrowly tailored" requirement of the time, place, or manner
calculus as necessitating nothing more than an inquiry into
whether the regulation was the least restrictive means of achieving
the intended objective. 9
As the dissent pointed out, the Court in Frisby v. Schultz
70
defined "narrowly tailored" as a regulation targeting and eliminat-
ing "no more than the exact source of evil [it] seeks to remedy.
7 1
The dissent saw Frisby as evidence that the Court had not rejected
the least-restrictive-alternative analysis.72 However, the majority
interpreted the Frisby language to mean that the regulation cannot
be substantially broader than necessary to achieve a substantial
government interest.7 s The majority's reading of Frisby established
a rule of great deference for the lower courts to follow when exam-
ining a governmental entity's time, place, or manner regulation.
In any event, the decision of the Supreme Court is not surpris-
ing. In several other cases subsequent to O'Brien, Lhe Court chose
not to engage in a least-restrictive-means analysis.7 ' Like Rock
Against Racism, one of these post-O'Brien cases-Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence 7 -involved a time, place, or
other performers, this effect would not be determinative of the Guidelines content
neutrality.
67. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
68. Id. at 377. See Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2757 (claiming that the Second
Circuit "drew its least-intrusive-means requirement from [O'Brien].")
69. Id.
70. 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
71. Id. at 2502.
72. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2761.
73. Id. at 2758.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (noting regulations
are not "invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that may be less bur-
densome on speech .... [Ain incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential,
and therefore is permissible under O'Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regula-
tion."); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (claiming
that the existence of alternatives that are less restrictive of speech and which still would
achieve the government interest cannot legitimize invalidating a regulation).
75. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In 1982, the National Park Service granted the Community
1989]
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manner regulation of speech in a traditional public forum. As in
Rock Against Racism, the Court in Clark did not perform a least-
restrictive-alternative analysis. If the Court had performed a least-
restrictive-alternative analysis in Clark, the Rock Against Racism
Court arguably would have been bound to examine the regulation
with greater scrutiny.7 However, because the Court refused to em-
ploy this analysis in Clark, the Rock Against Racism Court may
have been correct in refusing to apply it as well. Today, after the
Rock Against Racism Court's refusal to apply the more demanding
standard, judicial review of time, place, or manner regulations now
is tilted all the more toward a deferential analysis and away from
the protection of free expression.
The majority's conclusion that the city's Use Guidelines did
not constitute a prior restraint is technically incorrect. Because the
city does possess the authority to deny use of the forum in advance
of expression by turning down the volume, the city effectively
could prevent the communication of Rock Against Racism's mes-
sage, thereby exercising a prior restraint." The majority viewed
the city's stated goals-ensuring sound quality and controlling vol-
ume-as implicitly forbidding less than adequate sound. The ma-
jority also looked to the district court's finding that the city, in
practice, accommodated the music performers and other sponsors
by submitting to their wishes as to sound quality and conferred
with performers and sponsors as to their desired sound volume.7,
However, the problem inherent in the Court's argument is that no-
where did the guideline explicitly state that the city technician was
required to defer to the wishes of the performers and sponsors with
for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) a permit to conduct a demonstration in Washington,
D.C.'s Lafayette Park and the Mall for the purpose of highlighting the plight of America's
homeless. Id. at 291-92. In accordance with the permit, CCNV erected two symbolic tent
cities. Id. at 292. The lawsuit arose when the Park Service denied CCNV's request that
demonstrators be allowed to sleep in the tents. Id. The denial was based upon the National
Park Service regulations that only permitted camping in campgrounds designated for that
purpose. Id. at 290. As neither Lafayette Park nor the Mall had been designated for camp-
ing, the request was denied. Id. The Supreme Court held that the application of the Park
Service regulations was permissible as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction. Id. at
293-99.
76. As the dissent points out, the majority admonished the court of appeals for exam-
ining the degree to which speech may be restricted to serve a governmental interest and for
analyzing available alternatives. Yet, as the dissent notes, if a court cannot make this in-
quiry, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for a court to determine whether the govern-
ment's regulation burdens speech substantially more than necessary. Rock Against Racism,
109 S. Ct. at 2762 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2763 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2756.
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respect to sound quality or even to confer with them as to sound
volume levels. Further, the Use Guidelines lack narrowly drawn,
reasonable, and definite standards to ensure that the city does not
abuse its discretion when it has the capability to exercise a prior
restraint. The city's standards are vague, at best, and although it
may be "that perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been
required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity,"'79 the
Court in Ward opened the door even further to highly discretion-
ary governmental control of speech in public forums.
Barbara Irwin*
79. Id. at 2755.
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, University of Miami School of Law.
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